Final Offer Arbitration in the New Era of Major League Baseball by Gordon, Spencer B
by
Spencer B. Gordon
Spring 2006
I. Introduction
Baseball is a worldwide pastime that holds greats reverence for its history and traditions.  
Unfortunately, along with the aspects adored by fans throughout the centuries, Major League 
Baseball (“MLB”) also has a history of failed negotiations and bitter feuds between players and 
team owners on the issue of player salaries.  Player salary negotiations have evolved
tremendously as bargaining power fluctuated over the past fifty years.  Over time, the players
banded together and unionized, creating what is now known as the Major League Baseball 
Players Association (“MLBPA”).1 Since its inception, the MLBPA has developed an adversarial 
position to ownership, resulting in the need for a collective bargaining agreement and protocol 
for player-owner relations.
Under the collective bargaining agreement instituted as a result of the players’ strike of 
1994, players have lobbied for and obtained desirable terms under which they are entitled to 
negotiate their salaries prior to the expiration of their existing contracts.2 The type of salary 
negotiations utilized by Major League Baseball is known as final offer salary arbitration.3 The 
institution of salary arbitration in MLB has received rave reviews, and is often attributed for 
having saved the sport from the backlash of fan resentment following the players’ strike of 1994.  
Players are now more satisfied than ever with the ability to file for salary arbitration when they 
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feel their productivity exceeds the expectations contemplated at the time their existing contract 
were created.4
However, fans today take every opportunity to criticize and generally detest player greed, 
the monopolization of talent by wealthier, large-market organizations, and the disparity of 
quality play among the teams as a result .  This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
economic, athletic, and social impact of final offer salary arbitration in Major League Baseball.  
In Part II, the article delves into the motivations, fluctuations, and evolution of the player-owner 
relationship and free agency.  Part III of the commentary will then focus on the distinguishing 
features and intricacies of final offer arbitration.  Part IV discusses the unique procedural aspects 
of final arbitration in the framework of MLB, highlighting the positive and negative 
consequences perceptible in today’s game.  Part V addresses the comprehensive impact of final 
offer salary arbitration on MLB from the perspective of fans, team owners, and players.  Part VI 
offers a glimpse into the future of baseball under the current arbitral system.  Finally, Part VII 
concludes this article with a discussion of whether MLB can serve as a model of final offer 
arbitration for other potential applications.
II. History of player-team owner relationship
Since baseball was first organized as a professional sport in 1871, the game has been 
riddled with disputes and strife in connection with player salaries.5  In the early development of 
baseball, team owners created a dictatorship over their players known as the “reserve system.”6
4 Id. at 386.
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Under the system first developed in professional baseball, players constantly switched teams.7
Then, player contracts were only signed one year at a time, which enabled player to offer their 
services on the open market at the end of each season.8  Many regard this characteristic of early 
baseball as the predecessor to modern day free agency.9  The owners during this time period 
were often described as tight fisted and tyrannical, who grew more displeased with their lack of 
control over player mobility.10
On September 30, 1879 team owners among the newly formed National League of 
Baseball Clubs entered into a gentleman’s agreement whereby the owner of each team could 
designate five of his players as “off limits” from other teams until they were released.11
Accordingly, the owners agreed to refrain from contracting with these specific players, who were 
therefore “reserved” to their current club.12 The new “reserve system” oppressed player salaries, 
increased organization profits, and created a set of agreed upon standards under which the sport 
operated smoothly.13
As the success of the league continued, the reserve system was eventually expanded to 
cover entire teams.14  By the 1880’s, the team owners inserted a reserve clause in each individual 
player’s contract, barring him from signing with another team until released from his current 
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contract.15  As a result, once a player signed his first contract with a particular professional team, 
he became the property of that team, and was bound to play for that club for the remainder of his 
career.16
The monopolistic business practices of the baseball team owners were first challenged in 
1922 in Federal Baseball Club Inc. v. National League of Professional Clubs.17  The Court sided 
with the owner’s contention that the reserve system was an indispensable aspect of the sport, 
without which clubs could raid each others’ rosters for players and eventually destroy the 
game.18  Other failed attempts were made to invalidate the reserve system through the courts 
before players realized other avenues for obtaining equal bargaining power.19  In 1966, Marvin 
Miller was appointed as President of the Major League Players Association (“MLBPA”), and the 
players union’s bargaining status was indirectly approved by the National Labor Relations Board 
in 1969.20
15 Id
.
16 Id.  The renewal clauses often contained provisions which entitled the team an option to renew the player contract 
under the terms of the previous contract.  Id. Thereby, teams were able to renew player contracts every year without 
renegotiating terms or obtaining the consent of the players. Id. This often left players with the conundrum of being 
forced to play for the same team under the same conditions or permanently retire from the sport. Id. 
17 Id.
18 Id. In his rationale for endorsing the excessive power of the owners, Chief Justice Holmes determined that 
baseball was exempt from the antitrust laws.  Id.  In support of his decision, Holmes reasoned that baseball did not 
constitute interstate commerce and therefore not within the purview of the Sherman Act. Id.
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By 1973, the players union leveraged enough bargaining power to demand a salary 
arbitration provision from the owners.21  Fearing the union may not relent from its quest to 
completely overhaul the reserve clause, the owners actually proposed that individual salary 
disputes with players be submitted to arbitration.22  On February 25, 1973, a collective 
bargaining agreement was signed between the players union and the owners which provided for 
salary arbitration as a means for resolving salary disputes.23  The reserve system eventually 
reached its end at the hands of an impartial arbitrator named Peter Seitz in the Messersmith-
McNally Arbitration in 1976.24  Seitz issued an opinion that the reserve clause allowed teams to 
renew an expired contract for only one additional year, rather than the previous system of 
perpetual servitude.25  The Players Relations Committee immediately appealed the decision, 
claiming Seitz abused his authority, but the decision was upheld and the current system of free 
agency replaced the reserve system.26
Despite achieving an unprecedented position of power, the MLBPA feared unrestrained 
free agency would flood the open market with talent, causing a depression of salaries.27  Thus, an 
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24
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The owners maintained that when a team renewed a contract under the same terms as a player’s previous contract, 
the renewal clause was once again embedded within the renewed contract. Id.  This philosophy of a perpetual right 
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agency. Id.
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agreement was reached for a free agency system in which a player would not be eligible for free 
agency until six years of play were completed in the Major Leagues.28  This six year guarantee, 
replacing the former perpetual servitude enforced by the reserve system, and salary arbitration 
were solidified and linked under the 1976 Collective Bargaining Agreement, which changed the 
business of baseball forever.29
III. Final Offer Arbitration 
Major League Baseball has adopted a dispute resolution method known as Final Offer 
Arbitration (“FOA”) as an exclusive method for resolving contract based salary disputes between 
players and owners.30  This relatively new form of dispute resolution, final offer, or last-best 
offer arbitration, limits an arbitrator to choosing the final offer made by one of the parties.31  “It 
is designed to motivate each party to negotiation in good faith and genuinely attempt to 
compromise in order to create a final offer that an arbitrator will select as most reasonable.”32
Major League Baseball is the most publicized use of FOA, however it has been used effectively 
in the United States public sector as well.33
When a bargaining impasse is presented in conventional arbitration, an arbitrator has the 
option to select either party’s position on one or all pending issues, create a compromise between 
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the parties’ positions, or create a unique solution.34 Conventional arbitration is commonly 
criticized for the “chilling effect” it may have on the parties’ incentives to bargain in good faith, 
when they may have reason to believe a more attractive outcome may result from arbitration than 
negotiation.35  However, when Final Offer Arbitration is used to resolve a bargaining impasse, 
each party submits a proposed monetary award to the arbitrator before the hearing, at the 
conclusion of which, the arbitrator must choose one award without modification or 
compromise.36 This approach imposes drastic restrictions on the arbitrator's discretion and 
provides each party an incentive to offer a reasonable or defensible proposal, in the hope that it 
will be selected by the decisionmaker.37
Final Offer Arbitration entails the inherent risk of a third party neutral endorsing an 
adversary’s final offer.38  This potential to lose entirely in FOA thwarts the chilling effect that 
34 Id. at 387.
35 Id.  The theory of the chilling effect states that the availability of arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure 
decreases the willingness of the parties to engage in good faith and legitimate negotiations. Id.  Parties to a dispute 
may also rationalize the conventional arbitration process as a means of reaching some form of compromise from the 
parties’ respective positions, causing the parties to undervalue the risks associated with the arbitration hearing, 
posture during negotiations, and assert inflated positions so as to influence the arbitrator’s determination.  Id.
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may otherwise occur.39 It also “acts as a psychological, economic, and political incentive for the 
parties to reach their own agreement.”40
FOA facilitates good faith bargaining by motivating the parties to calculate and present 
their most reasonable positions prior to the arbitration.41  Final offers in salary arbitration tend to 
be reasonable, because they may not have been proposed in prior negotiations and the offers are 
exchanged simultaneously, making it impossible for the parties to base counteroffers upon the
other’s offer.42  Therefore, it forces each party to independently determine a reasonable and 
defensible monetary valuation of a player that is likely to be found more reasonable than the 
value reached by the other side.43  In addition, the final offer process evokes information that is 
typically otherwise concealed during negotiations, hindering the parties’ ability to settle.44  As 
each party discloses more information regarding “risk preferences and knowledge of facts 
relevant to the arbiter’s decision,” the likelihood of reaching a settlement increases.45  FOA also 
creates distributive and interest-based settlement incentives by excluding non-financial issues 
from arbitration and enabling the parties to gauge their likelihood of success after the final offers 
are submitted.46
39 Id.
40 Id.
41
 Id. A “reasonable” position in the framework of FOA is an offer that is defensible and adoptable based upon the 
criteria an arbitrator may take into consideration.  Id.
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43 Id. at 388.
44 Id. at 389.
45 Id.
46 Id.
The distributive incentive to settle in FOA arises out of the midpoint between the final 
offers, which provides the arbitrator a starting point for valuation and a range of numbers in 
which the parties can negotiate.47  This enables each party to evaluate the offers presented and 
the likelihood that the arbitrator would determine the value of the player to be greater or less than 
the midpoint.48 The offer that is closer to the value determined by the arbitrator is likely to win 
the arbitration, which allows the parties to settle accordingly.49 Thus, when organizations submit 
offers significantly lower than the players’ proposals, they often scramble to settle on the 
player’s side of the midpoint before hearings conclude out of fear of losing entirely.  
In baseball arbitration, final offers that are relatively close together often settle, because a 
compromise is not far off.50  Likewise, final offers that are extreme often settle as well, because 
such a disparity increases the likelihood of the arbitrator choosing the side with the more 
reasonable offer over the other.51  The possibility of experiencing a devastatingly expensive loss 
in arbitration creates a significant incentive to settle.52
Interest-based incentives to settle are based upon the readily apparent fact that the parties 
must coincide in pursuit of a common goal following the salary dispute process.  These 
relationship-specific variables encourage settlement on both sides of the battleground.  Once the 
arbitration process begins, meaning the club has decided to tender the player, the players will 
47 Id. at 390.  Because baseball salary disputes tend to settle at or near the midpoint, the party with the more 
defensible number with respect to the midpoint generally receives a more favorable settlement.  Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50
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continue to play for their clubs for at least one year after the arbitration.53  Accordingly, teams 
prefer to avoid arbitration hearings in which they may be forced to defend their proposals by 
insulting players and presenting arguments that emphasize a player’s mental and physical 
shortcomings, limited contributions to the team in the past, club record since being a member of 
the team, or less than ideal public appeal.54
On the other side of the bargaining table, players may wish to avoid that actual arbitration 
hearing as well in order to secure benefits that may otherwise be foregone in the arbitration 
process.55  Benefits that players commonly negotiate for that are precluded from arbitration 
awards, include but are not limited to individual or team performance based bonuses, guaranteed 
contracts, no trade clauses, single occupancy rooms on road trips, requiring the team to pay 
charges incurred in road trips upfront rather than a reimbursement system, locker room 
perquisites, and specific arrangements to accommodate a player’s family.56  A player may prefer 
settlement as a means of preserving any number of potential benefits that may be negotiated 
outside of arbitration.  
Furthermore, the potential to bargain for multi-year contracts also has the potential to 
encourage both parties to settle.57  A critical feature of salary arbitration is limiting the awards to 
one-year contracts.  Organizations often seek guarantees of players’ services for extended 
periods so the team may experience the benefit of a player’s improved performance without the 
53
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54 Id.
55 Id.  Bearing in mind that baseball salary FOA only addresses the issue of salary for the player’s immediately 
following season, it does not offer a forum in which the parties can negotiate on other potential deal points that 
could potentially appease the players.  
56 Id.
57 Id. at 391.
obligation of increasing compensation, harkening back to the reserve system era.  The FOA 
system exists to accommodate the players who hold more positive self-perceptions of their skills 
and potential, and therefore, prefer one-year contracts so they may test their values on the open-
market in the more immediate future.  Nevertheless, settlement in FOA may be desirable for both 
parties, as many players value highly the job security provided by multi-year contracts, while 
team owners appreciate guarantees from players.58
FOA can take several forms and variations thereof, which are designed to reach specific 
goals of the dispute resolution process.59  In “issue-by-issue” FOA, the arbitrator has flexibility 
to balance an award across the issues presented by selecting a final offer on each issue 
independently.60  However, “package Final Offer Arbitration” is more closely aligned with the 
goals and essence of FOA, pursuant to which the arbitrator chooses one party’s final offer on all 
issues in dispute.61  Salary arbitration in Major League Baseball is largely viewed as somewhat 
of a hybrid between these two common systems of FOA, considering salary is  the only issue in 
dispute, yet it entails the high degree of risk commonly associated with the package system.62  As 
such, FOA in the context of baseball is categorized as neither a package nor issue-by- issue
system.  
58 Id.
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FOA can take the form of issue-by-issue system or a package final offer system.  Id.  In addition, FOA procedure 
can be varied by concealing final offers, presentation of dual final offers, hiring independent fact finders, combining 
various forms of alternative dispute resolution, negotiation after submission of final offers, confidentiality, and 
allocation of costs. See id. at 394-402.
60 Id. at 394.  However, in issue-by-issue FOA, the ability to maintain the structure of FOA procedure breaks down 
as more issues are presented in the dispute, essentially becoming conventional arbitration. Id.
61 Id.  Under the package system, the discretion bestowed upon arbiters in conventional and issue-by-issue 
arbitration is eliminated. Id.  The lack of discretion increases the risk to the parties of having their entire offer 
rejected, thereby maximizing each party’s incentive to negotiate a settlement. Id.
62
 Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball at 230. 
This unique amalgamation of an otherwise sparsely used dispute resolution tool raises 
questions whether it accomplishes its stated purpose of narrowing salary disputes and 
encouraging settlement between the parties. Nevertheless, proponents of Final Offer Salary 
Arbitration in baseball argue FOA is a successful tool because it saves time and money over 
conventional arbitration by providing structure to negotiations and strict procedural 
requirements, while minimizing player-owner acrimony and the potential chilling effect.63
IV. The Unique Procedural Aspects and Benefits of Final Offer Arbitration in MLB
Pursuant to the terms of the current Basic Agreement, any player with a “total of three 
or more years of Major League service, however accumulated, but with less than six years of 
Major League service” may file for salary arbitration.64  Both players and organizations have the 
ability to file for salary arbitration without the consent of the other party.65  However, players 
with at least two but less than three years of Major League service who have accumulated at least 
eighty-six days of service during the immediately preceding season are also eligible for 
arbitration if they rank in the top seventeen percent in total service in the class of players who 
have at least two but less than three years of Major League service in the preceding season.66  In 
addition, players with at least six years of experience who are not eligible for free agency at the 
end of the preceding season may elect salary arbitration with the team’s consent.67
63
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To invoke the arbitration clause, a grievance must be filed between January 5th and 15th, 
after which the player and the team have three days within which to submit final salary offers to 
a three-member panel of impartial arbitrators.68  The hearings then take place between February 
1st and February 20th, in which the arbitrators may consider particular criteria for resolving the 
dispute.  Such criteria typically include the quality of the player’s contributions to the team 
during the immediately preceding season (including the player’s overall performance, qualities 
of leadership, and public appeal); the length and consistency of the player’s career performance; 
the record of the player’s past compensation; comparative baseball salaries throughout the 
league; the existence of any physical or mental defects on the part of the player; and the club’s 
recent performance (including overall record and standing, as well as attendance as an indicia of 
public acceptance).69  The Basic Agreement does not apportion weight among the above-
mentioned factors, thus the arbitrator is free to decide how much weight is to be given each 
factor.70
Once each side has presented all relevant evidence, the arbitrator is generally required to 
render a decision within twenty-four hours, in which “opinions, explanations, findings, or 
statements of reasons…regarding his opinion” are strictly forbidden.71  Arbitration decisions are 
68
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then announced throughout the arbitration season, which is criticized for the potential influence 
early decisions may have on those later in the season.72
Despite having originally proposed the concept of salary arbitration and their successful 
record against esteemed Major League players in arbitration, owners are quick to point the blame 
for baseball’s current economic imbalance at salary arbitration.73 The arbitration system in place 
spares the parties and arbitrators from creating and considering voluminous briefs, which 
streamlines the process and facilitates adherence to the strict time restraints.74  In addition, the 
confidential nature of the calculation and submission of final offers preserves the integrity of the 
player-owner relationship.75 Time requirements for filing, submission of final offers, the 
hearing, and the arbitrator’s decision allows for all salary disputes to be settled prior to the start 
of the upcoming season, whereas the parties would otherwise be subject to lengthy and costly 
litigation processes to settle these contract disputes.  
Furthermore, the preclusion of written decisions eliminates additional costs associated 
with appeals and dissatisfaction with awards.76  Because both parties are aware that the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement does not contemplate or provide further recourse following an 
award, the process does not continue.
In the context of its dispute resolution capacity, Final Offer Arbitration has proven to be a 
successful addition to Major League Baseball by establishing job-security for players, ensuring 
72
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clubs are fully stocked with players under contract, providing monetary incentives for high 
player performance, and saving an incalculable amount of time and money by isolating and 
controlling grievances.   
V. The Comprehensive Impact on Major League Baseball
Over the past twenty-two years, baseball salaries have sky-rocketed in part due to 
continually record-breaking arbitration awards.  The largest arbitration award in 1973 was 
granted to Reggie Jackson in his MVP season for a then staggering $135,000.77  The highest 
arbitration award in the 2005 arbitration season was to Roger Clemens of the Houston Astros for 
$18,000,000, which was the largest single-season salary for a pitcher in baseball history.78
Between 1976 and 1996 average arbitration awards rose from $68,000 to $2,300,000; a 
compound growth rate of 23%.79  The average annual salary in baseball in 1973, when salary 
arbitration was first introduced, was a meager $36,566 compared to $2,630,000 in 2005.80 Most 
fans, commentators, and owners blame the powerful combination of free agency and salary 
arbitration for the fact that baseball wage increases have outpaced the cost of living by 
approximately 5,000% during that time.81  However, the average annual salary actually dropped 
77
 Dave Studeman, All About Arbitration, The Hardball Times, January 31, 2005 at 
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in 2004 for the first time since 1990 and the median salary of $850,000 in 2005 is still well 
below its all time high of $975,000 in 2001.82
A. Team Owners’ Perspective
When considering the reserve system immediately preceded the free agency and salary 
arbitration era of baseball, team owners understandably criticize the dramatic increase in player 
salaries over the past thirty years.  Nevertheless, a statistical and economic analysis is warranted 
before dubbing salary arbitration as the bane of our national pastime.83 Perhaps most noteworthy 
in this analysis is the fact that only about 25% of the employees in the bargaining unit of baseball 
players are covered by the salary arbitration clause.84  Because of the eligibility requirements, 
relatively few players actually invoke the arbitration clause and far fewer every complete the
hearing process, which suggests arbitration may not be the sole source of the salary inflation.85
Furthermore, clubs are not required to renew a player’s contract when a player elects to file for 
salary arbitration.  The club has the option to either participate in the dispute resolution process 
in order to retain the player for an additional year or to refrain from offering a contract to that 
player, which is referred to as a nontender.86
Owner’s complaints are also questioned by the fact that owners have won 59% of their 
cases that actually complete the formal resolution process; prevailing at a rate of approximately 
82
 Ronald Blum, Associated Press, Average Baseball Salary Hits Record $2.6M, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=649077&page=2
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84 Id.
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86 Id. at 237. 
80% in 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2002.87  Notwithstanding the historical success of the clubs in 
arbitration, the owners maintain their position that arbitration is a win-win proposition for 
players, consequently inflating salaries above players’ market value.88  Salary Arbitration is 
described as a win-win proposition for the players, because both settlement agreements and a 
team’s final offer will both exceed a player’s salary in the preceding season due to the team’s 
fear of losing entirely.89
While owners agree final offer salary arbitration encourages settlement, players also gain 
considerably from settlements that arise out of the arbitration setting.90  To illustrate that point, 
ten of sixteen clubs prevailed in the 1994 season of arbitration hearings, yet the aggregate 
salaries of the sixteen players involved rose 95%.91  As large revenue disparities continue to 
grow in the sport and the cost of maintaining competitive teams drives up ticket and concession 
prices.  The owners point the finger at salary arbitration and free agency.92
Following the season-shortening strike of 1994 and growing economic strain on the sport, 
a Blue Ribbon Panel was commissioned in 1998 to report on the causes and potential solutions 
for the revenue disparities and competitive imbalances in Major League Baseball.  In its July 
2000 report, the panel did not cite salary arbitration as a source of salary inflation, nor did it 
87
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suggest any structural reforms in the arbitration process that would ameliorate the league’s 
troubles.93
Yet, neither the players association nor the league can deny that only three Major League 
teams achieved profitability between 1995 and 1999.94  Most importantly, owners do not find it 
coincidental that the only two professional sports that use arbitration as a method for establishing 
salaries, Major League Baseball and the National Hockey League, also have the most 
acrimonious labor relations of all professional sports.95
B. Fan Perspective
In the aftermath of the 1994 players strike, baseball fans are skeptical of the detrimental 
effect of soaring player salaries on the overall appeal of the sport.  What has evolved since the 
1973 Collective Bargaining Agreement is a merit-based compensation system in a free market, 
where young players are now motivated to play at their best of their ability at all times in hopes 
of being rewarded in arbitration.  However, this process has caused a drastic shift in bargaining 
power to the players and large-market clubs.96
Many fans perceive the changes in modern day baseball, including high wage disparity, 
high revenue disparity, high ticket prices, high concession prices, and competitive imbalances 
93
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at 1. 
among the divisions and teams to be a direct result of soaring salaries and arbitration awards.97
The escalating cost to clubs of fielding competitive teams in smaller Major League markets has 
jeopardized baseball’s traditional perception as “the affordable family spectator sport.”98  Fans 
are watching ticket prices climb along with player salaries, particularly in Philadelphia and 
Boston, where average ticket prices jumped 26% and 12% respectively from 2003 to 2004.99 On 
average, a family of four spent $155.52 for a day at a big-league ball park in 2004, causing a 
general decline in family attendance.100
Fans have taken notice of clubs’ attempts to keep up with the salary demands of players 
by raising the price of tickets, parking, food, and beverages as well as redecorating Major League 
Ballparks with corporate sponsorships.101  As the fans are forced to pay more to watch their 
favorite teams compete, they expect some solace in being provided a winning team in return.102
Unfortunately for many fans, that is not the case.  In recent years a high correlation has 
developed between payroll and success on the field, and cost of attendance may not necessarily 
reflect the quality of the end product.103  The disparity of success between teams in high and low 
97 Id.at 2.  Local revenues, including gate receipts, local television, radio and cable rights fees, ballpark concessions, 
advertising and publications, parking, suit rentals, postseason and spring training are the largest single component of 
annual revenues for most Major League Clubs. Id. “The ratio bewteeen the highest and lowest club’s local revenues 
more than double in five years from 5.5:1 in 1995 to 14.7:1 in 1999.” Id.  At the time of the Blue Ribbon Panel 
investigation, the combined payrolls of the two teams with highest payrolls exceeded the combined payrolls of all in 
the bottom quartile of payrolls be $30 million. Id.
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revenue markets in the 1990’s was staggering.  No club whose payroll fell in the bottom half of 
the industry won a single postseason game out of the 158 MLB postseason games played 
between 1995 and 1999.104  Only one such team even made it to the postseason during that 
span.105 This imbalance in the sport forces fans to wonder how the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, with 
an annual payroll of $29.9 million in 2005, have any chance of competing with the New York 
Yankees, whose payroll just slipped under the $200 million mark in 2005.106
The fans have no other answer for the rapid changes in the sport other than player 
salaries.  So why does salary arbitration take the rap for all of the problems in modern day 
baseball?  Fans and critics perceive salary arbitration with a negative connotation because 
players chose to file a dispute, thereby forcing their team to pay a higher salary, which directly 
impacts the team’s ability to pay for other players that could make the team more competitive. 
Despite the expanding global market for baseball and opportunities to make the game 
more popular, the combination of competitive imbalance and rising prices could eventually 
alienate MLB’s core fan base, making the development of new generations of baseball fans 
problematic. “Competition for the sports entertainment dollar, and for the sport fan’s attention, 
is increasingly intense.”107  In the early days of baseball, the sport held the attention of sports 
104 Id. at 12.
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fans from opening day through October.108  However, today, there are only six weeks between 
the final National Basketball Association (“NBA”) championship game and the first National 
Football League (“NFL”) preseason game.109
Although there are a multitude of other factors that play into general fan sentiment and 
the popularity of baseball, salary arbitration is often targeted, arguably unfairly, as the culprit of 
the troubled economic structure of baseball.
C. Players’ Perspective
The traditional sentiment of Major League Baseball players is that they are 
underappreciated and underpaid.  Not much has changed in that respect since the reserve system 
era, as modern day players remain under a system in which owners are able to compensate their 
younger players well below the full market value of their ability and performance.  The most 
prominent example of this exploitation is Albert Pujols of the St. Louis Cardinals.  
In 2002, Albert became the first player in baseball history to complete a season with at 
minimum batting average of .300, 30 home runs, 100 runs scored, and 100 RBIs in each of his 
first two major league seasons, a year in which Albert’s salary was a mere $600,000.110  In 2002, 
the average Major League Baseball salary was $2,272,620 with an overall median salary of 
$911,250.111  What’s more, at least 426 major league players 2002 were placed in higher salary 
108 Id.
109 Id.
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brackets than Albert, yet none of those players had performed at Albert’s unprecedented level 
and arguably no other player contributed as much to his team over a two year period.112
Nevertheless, because of the required three years of Major League experience to become
eligible for salary arbitration and file a grievance, Pujols played through the 2003 season earning 
only $950,000.113  However, upon completion of Albert’s third Major League season, a panel 
determined his salary was an utter injustice considering his career contribution with the St. Louis 
Cardinals and the salaries of comparable players during that period.114
Today, players are entitled to test their values in the free agency market once they have 
completed six Major League seasons, however, those who perform at elite levels several years 
prior to their eligibility for free agency are grossly underpaid.  Furthermore, players who fit into 
the latter category do not only contribute immensely to their teams’ success, but they also 
increase their teams’ marketability.  Major League organizations sell team merchandise in their 
stadiums, in sporting good stores around the world, and on countless websites on the Internet.  
As these young, high-performing players improve the performance and marketability of their 
respective organizations, team owners are also able to increase revenues from merchandise, 
licensing of broadcasting rights to local television networks, and corporate sponsorships, all of 
which will never benefit those players.      
112 Id.
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Bearing in mind the transmutation of the reserve system into the free agency system, it is 
evident that arbitration serves as necessary tool to reconcile the inherent conflicts that arise out 
of a compromise of the two systems.  Although, players are now able to demand exorbitant 
salaries in the free agency market today, the advantage of the owners in the first six years of 
every player’s Major League career is too great for the players who simply deserve more.      
D. Balanced Assessment 
A balanced assessment, taking various studies and developments into consideration, is 
necessary to evaluate the current state of baseball and the role of final offer arbitration in the 
sport.  Since the Blue Ribbon Panel addressed the growing concern of competitive imbalance in 
Major League Baseball in 2000, many mid to low revenue market teams have shown noteworthy 
improvement.  Teams such as the A’s, Indians, Marlins, Twins, Astros, Angels, and Whitesox, 
are teams that are not in the top quartile of Major League payrolls yet have achieved varying 
levels of success; either ma king the playoffs, winning their division or the World Series.115  The 
return to competitive balance in the past several years is probably made most obvious by the 
Yankee’s five year streak without winning a World Series despite having the highest payroll in 
the league since 1999.116 Furthermore, the 2005 World Series included the Houston Astros and 
the Chicago White Sox, with only the 12th and 13th highest payrolls in the league, respectively.117
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The 2005 World Series Champion White Sox managed to accomplish that feat with a payroll of 
$75,228,000.118
The ability of low to mid revenue market teams to not only compete, but succeed in 
recent seasons, has restored the interest and hope of baseball fans across the country, and caused
baseball analysts to question the preconceived notion that money buys success.  Several recent 
studies have been conducted to test the validity of that concept, testing correlations between 
wage disparities among team members and productivity, as well as the correlation between 
overall player salary increases and salary arbitration awards.
The dramatic increase in baseball salaries attributed to arbitration has fueled concern that 
“intrateam wage disparity may cause a breakdown of team cohesiveness and performance.”119
This hypothesis has been confirmed with empirical evidence by the Department of Economics at 
the University of Texas at Arlington.  Using team win percentage as a measure of team 
productivity and an intra-team Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to measure salary dispersion, 
the study sought to determine the impact of paying superstar players significantly higher salaries 
relative to his teammates.120
The study concluded with a high level of confidence that compensating certain players 
greater percentages of each teams’ total salary expenditure, or wage disparity, actually decreases 
the overall performance of the team.121  Thus, small market teams are unlikely to derive a benefit 
from acquiring only one or two highly skilled players whose salaries are significantly higher than 
118 Id.
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the remainder of the team.122  This evidence supports the notion asserted by A’s general 
manager, Billy Beane, that a major league club can be well balanced, productive, and successful 
through superior player evaluation, development, and strategy, and not simply money.123
Furthermore, a study conducted by Andrew Tarman of the The Park Place Economist
also suggests free agency, and not salary arbitration, is more accountable for escalating player 
salaries.124  Empirical evidence has shown players with more than six years experience and able 
to offer their services on the open market are subject to salaries closest to their “productivity” or 
market value.125 Productivity in this context is measured by “OPS,” which sums a player’s on 
base percentage and slugging percentage, and is regarded by baseball statisticians as the most 
accurate indicator of offensive performance.126 These results of the study also indicate the 
monopsonistic behavior of owners that plagued the reserve system era of baseball lingers in the 
first six years of player contracts.127  Players with less than six years of service who use 
arbitration to resolve salary disputes are still not receiving salaries commensurate with their level 
of productivity.128  Therefore, it can be concluded that arbitration is a significantly smaller factor 
in the inflation of baseball salaries than the existence of the free agency system in Major League 
Baseball.     
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VI. The Future of Baseball Under the Current Arbitral System
The current state of baseball in the era of free agency and salary arbitration poses several 
questions, the answers to which will be vital to the long-term economic viability of Major 
League Baseball.  These difficult questions include whether clubs will become insolvent and 
forced into bankruptcy, whether small market teams will be forced to relocate to larger markets, 
whether salary arbitration will play a central role in the future of MLB, the likelihood of another 
player strike, and what are the potential solutions.
In 2002, baseball commissioner Allan “Bud” Selig as owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, 
was one of 29 teams that bought the then Montreal Expos for $120 million after legal challenges 
prevented MLB from driving the franchise into bankruptcy.129  This symbol of MLB’s economic 
struggles is one reason baseball enthusiasts fear several other low-revenue organizations may 
face the same fate, only without the parachute used to catch the Expos.  However, the recent 
proliferation of revenue sharing has allowed the low performing and low revenue teams to 
sufficiently compensate high draft selections and acquire more productive players in the free 
agency market.  Furthermore, the new wave of managerial emphasis on player recruitment, 
development, and trades has made previously poor performing teams significantly more 
competitive, irrespective of financial allocations provided by MLB’s revenue sharing program.  
Accordingly, the financial uncertainty of small market clubs is in the process of stabilizing and 
bankruptcy is an option that remains a last resort for the teams and MLB.  
One potential solution that has churned up some media attention of late is the relocation 
of several organizations to cities and markets that already support successful professional sports 
teams or are ripe for their first.  In 2005 the former Montreal Expos were relocated to 
129
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Washington D.C. and renamed the “Nationals” in an effort to revitalize the organization.  Talks 
have also been initiated regarding the relocation of MLB teams to San Antonio, Texas and 
Portland, Oregon, two cities that currently support NBA teams but are without a professional 
baseball team.  In March of 2006, billionare B.J. “Red” McCombs announced his intention to 
purchase a minority interest in the Florida Marlins, a team that has struggled to draw attendance 
and maintain a competitive payroll, so that he may relocate the franchise to San Antonio,
Texas.130
The state of Oregon is so enthusiastic about bringing a MLB team to Portland, it has 
established a coalition in collaboration with city and state leaders to secure financing for a 
stadium and influence Major League Baseball to relocate an organization.131  In addition, Las 
Vegas City officials and investors tendered offers as a potential host city for the floundering 
Montreal Expos several years ago, and optimists are still lobbying for another franchise to give 
“Sin-City” a chance.132  On the whole, MLB officials recognize the need to make proactive 
change in order to avert potential financial crises in cities experiencing difficulty in sustaining 
revenues or competitive performance, such as Miami (Marlins), Tampa Bay (Devil Rays), 
Kansas City (Royals), Minnesota (Twins), Cleveland (Indians), and view contraction as a last 
resort.
Other potential solutions that may improve the financial position of MLB are contraction 
and implementation of a salary cap.  Contraction is the proposed movement of eliminating 
certain franchises that are unable to generate revenues sufficient to field a competitive team or 
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support the costs of the organization.  The theory behind this proposed solution is that the league 
grew too large for its own good, and should now reduce the number of teams in the league in 
order to achieve more equally dispersed talent and a generally higher level of play.  Proponents 
of contraction also believe this will lower the market demand for players, increasing competition 
for the remaining positions, and eventually driving down player salaries.  However, barriers to 
contraction are the resistance of current owners, host city officials, and loyal fans, which will 
ultimately make this alternatively unlikely as a near term solution.  
A “salary cap is a limit on the amount of money a team can spend on player salaries, 
either as a per-player limit or a total limit for the team's roster or both.”133 Several professional 
sports leagues have incorporated mandatory salary caps, which prevents overall costs from 
soaring and balances the leagues so wealthier teams cannot become dominant simply by paying 
higher salaries for the most productive players.  Currently, the NBA, NFL, and NHL all operate 
under a salary cap system.  
The lone sport without a salary cap, MLB, has implemented a luxury-tax whereby teams 
with aggregate payrolls in excess of an annually revised dollar amount must contribute to a pool 
that is allocated among the less affluent teams.134 One problem with the luxury tax system, 
however, is that owners are not required to spend the money received from the luxury pool 
directly on players, in fact, there are no restrictions imposed upon owners with respect to the 
manner in which that money is used.  Further, Major League Baseball is also alone in the 
absence of a minimum required team payroll, rather the only minimum restriction for team 
payrolls are based on league minimum salaries which vary by levels of experience as required by 
133 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salary_cap
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the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement.135  Implementation of the proposed salary cap would 
also address the problem of deficient payrolls as well, requiring clubs to maintain payrolls within 
a predetermined range.136 Despite the belief commonly held among players that the salary cap 
concept poses an illegal restraint on the labor market, it would curtail the spending of certain 
wealthy teams, make spending more efficient, and could ultimately create a lower equilibrium of 
salaries in the free agency market.137
Whether MLB stays the course with revenue sharing and luxury taxes or implements a 
league wide salary cap, the likelihood of a player strike is minimal as long as transitions are 
methodical and incremental.  For the time being, growth in player salaries has been stymied by 
higher luxury taxes and local revenue allocations, which has also been accompanied by a return 
of competitive balance.  The baseball economy appears to be stabilizing, and as long as player 
salaries are not drastically undercut, a player strike should be avoidable in the future.  
With respect to the role of final offer arbitration in the future of MLB, there is no 
indication that it will become the target of team owner reform initiatives.  The advent of salary 
arbitration in professional baseball was a tremendous victory for the Major League Baseball
Players Association, and continues to quell acrimony between players and owners.  The 
economic shortcoming of baseball’s financial system is not in the Player’s ability to demand fair 
market value for their services, but rather the salaries the fair market dictates and permits.  Thus, 
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as baseball strategists hone in on the source of the problem, efforts will centralize around reeling 
salaries back into a range commensurate with team revenues.  
Although critics tend to lump salary Final Offer Arbitration into the list of all that is 
wrong with Major League Baseball, salary disputes may have completely destroyed the sport and 
forever tainted its image with fans had baseball not adopted this method of dispute resolution.  
Eliminating salary arbitration from the current system would essentially force young players 
back into the reserve system under which team owners would unfairly exploit and under 
compensate many young players.  Reformation or elimination of salary arbitration is both 
unlikely and futile as such efforts would fail to address the root of baseball’s economic problems.       
VII. Conclusion
Salary arbitration has an undeniably positive effect on Major League Baseball, most 
noticeably by controlling the damage caused by player grievances that have mounted since the 
advent of free agency.  However, along with its saving grace, its critics argue salary arbitration 
has contributed to the inflation of salaries, the disparity of talent among teams with varying 
resources, and arguably the appeal of the sport to its fans.  Final offer arbitration is a unique 
aspect of baseball that has evoked a wide spectrum of skepticism and curiosity.  It has taken 
nearly thirty years for members of the baseball community to determine how it has impacted the 
game and some are still uncertain as to its fate in the future of the sport.  At first glance, salary 
arbitration appears to be a considerable source of inflation for already exorbitant baseball 
salaries.  
However, upon closer examination, it is clear that final offer arbitration provides a unique 
method of dispute resolution that fosters player-owner relations, good faith negotiations, and a 
structured system of maintaining the baseball economy.  Use of FOA in Major League Baseball 
provides an excellent model for the resolution of disputes in contexts in which the parties are 
inevitably intertwined.  The protocol and restrictions implicit in the FOA system eliminate risk s
and costs normally associated with disputes of such a magnitude, enabling the business of 
baseball to operate without interruption.  Final offer salary arbitration has taken heat from 
baseball analysts, fans, and team owners, yet it is an effective tool that is likely to remain a part 
of baseball for some time to come.
